Student: I think it may be due to the fact there were 9 law lords sitting in Holley, all accepting that they were ruling not only on the law of Jersey but also that of England and Wales. Apparently 6 of them decided that Morgan Smith wrongly interpreted the Homicide Act 1957 and preferred the interpretation of the earlier Privy Council decision in the Hong Kong case of Luc Thiet Thuan v R. 7 Professor: You mean to say you have actually read these cases to which you refer?
Student: Of course -haven't you?
Professor: I, er, well... Hey this isn't about me. I think it might be time for a bit of Socratic dialogue. If you know so much about this, perhaps you could enlighten the rest of the class. For starters, what part of the Homicide Act was under consideration? Student: Oh that is easy. It is section 3 which deals with provocation, the partial defence to murder:
"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his selfcontrol, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man."
All the recent cases related to the so-called second limb of provocation. If the jury is satisfied that the accused may have been provoked to lose his/her self control (the first limb) they must go on in applying the second limb to assess whether the reasonable man would also lose his self control. It is the second limb that has caused all of the problems.
Professor:
What was it about the second limb that was controversial?
Student:
Well it is all to do with the old objective / subjective conundrum, isn't it?
Professor: Go on...
You know; the question of whether the reasonable man referred to in the statute should be an "objective" reasonable man or whether he should have some of the "subjective" characteristics of the accused.
Professor: What difference would it make?
Student: Assuming that the jury thought the accused had actually been provoked to lose his self control when he killed the victim then, if the subjective approach won through, the jury would take into account the accused's own characteristics when deciding if a reasonable man would do the same. In other words in assessing the reasonable man's standard of self control he would have the characteristics of the accused.
So, for example, in Luc Thiet Thian the accused had brain damage; in Morgan Smith, he had severe depression; in Holley he was an alcoholic; in James the accused had an unspecified psychiatric condition that impaired his ability to control himself; in Karimi, he had post-traumatic stress disorder. If the subjective approach was applied, the jury would assess the standard of self control of the reasonable man with brain damage, with depression, with alcoholism etc. Thus the jury would be assessing whether, in light of the accused's characteristics, including any mental disorder, the response to the provocation should properly be excused in part. As Lord Clyde put it, "whether the defendant exercised the degree of self-control to be expected of someone in his situation". 10 The advocates of this approach felt that it would not remove the objective nature of the test but it would accommodate the accused's individual characteristics: Student: If the objective approach prevailed, then the jury would assess the reasonableness of the accused's response to the provocation by reference to a reasonable man of ordinary fortitude. They would not be told about the accused's peculiar characteristics insofar as they might affect his ability to control himself.
Professor: So on the objective approach, the accused's own characteristics are irrelevant? Student: Hmm. Not entirely. Even on the objective approach the accused's characteristics are relevant to the gravity of the provocation. It is readily accepted that any particular idiosyncrasy of the accused should be taken into account insofar as it might have made the provocative conduct worse. 13 In part this is a consequence of the 1957 Act expanding the definition of what could amount to provocative conduct to include things said in addition to things done. If words could suffice, then it followed that verbal provocation directed at a particular characteristic of the accused should be taken into account by the jury in determining the reasonableness of the response. As Lord Diplock put it in R v Camplin, 14 the gravity of the provocation could depend on, "the particular characteristics or circumstances of the person to whom a taunt or insult is addressed." 15 Professor: Let us be clear about this -on the objective approach if I have, say, epilepsy and someone taunts me about it to the point where I stab him to death, the jury can take account of my condition in deciding how reasonable it was for me to be provoked but not in deciding whether I exercised reasonable self restraint?
Student: Exactly -they would hear evidence of your epilepsy when deciding how aggrieved you would be by the taunts. This would clearly have some impact on the reasonableness of your response. However, they would have to put out of their mind any impact your epilepsy might have on your ability to control yourself. Professor: Wait a moment, you said earlier it was a "reasonable man" but now it is a person of the age and sex of the accused. They are personal characteristics.
Student:
Yes, I suppose they are. It could be argued that they are exceptions to the reasonableness, test but Lord Nicholls in Holley argued they were no such thing: Op. cit. at paragraph 13, emphasis in original. in the use of this prescribed standard as a uniform standard applicable to all defendants is the possibility that an individual defendant may be temperamentally unable to achieve this standard. Professor: How did we get into this position in the first place? You said a moment ago that Camplin 21 established an objective test including a jury direction that referred to "ordinary" powers of self control. Did Morgan Smith overrule Camplin?
No. Bizarrely, despite adopting diametrically opposing views, both the majority and minority in Morgan Smith claimed to be following the principles enunciated in Camplin. The majority took the view that Lord Diplock's speech in that case was not clearly indicative of a wholly objective approach. Lord Hoffman argued that the references to the sex and age of the accused were illustrative only and not intended to limit the relevant characteristics. Moreover, it was argued that Lord Diplock had made no clear distinction between characteristics affecting the gravity of the provocation and those affecting the accused's powers of self control. Essentially their Lordships in the majority employed a creative interpretation of the Camplin approach in order to fit with their view as to the principles underpinning the law and the needs of justice.
This was a judgement reaching to the fundamentals of criminal liability. The majority was concerned not just with practical difficulties with an objective test but with a perceived incoherence in the strict doctrine that sidelined the concept of capacity for self-control when considering provocation. Their Lordships were concerned that the law imposed a straightjacket which required a strict demarcation between the respective defences to murder which was not warranted by reality: In other words the two partial defences to murder ought to be conceptually and morally distinct but the subjective approach to provocation encouraged an unsustainable overlap between the defences. Nevertheless the idea of integrating the two defences has also had its proponents. For example, Mackay and Mitchell have argued strongly for the logic of the Morgan Smith decision to be recognised explicitly by the creation of a single defence which combined elements of provocation and diminished responsibility. 24
Professor: But to come back to the current state of the law, you are saying that the majority view in Morgan Smith has not prevailed and that the objective approach is now the correct test in English law?
Student: Yes.
Professor: And you say this is the case despite the decision coming from the Privy Council, which is not even binding on English courts and despite the House of Lords decision being only 5 years old? Student: Just so. Professor Andrew Ashworth acknowledged it was a novel approach to the development of the law but the reality was that Holley now represented the law:
"Is Holley binding on English courts? There may be a purist strain of argument to the effect that it is not, since it concerns another legal system (that of Jersey). However, the reality is that nine Lords of Appeal in Ordinary sat in this case, and that for practical purposes it was intended to be equivalent of a sitting of the House of Lords. It is likely that anyone attempting to argue that Morgan Smith is still good law in England and Wales would receive short shrift." 25
Student: Well the interesting thing was that the majority in Holley did not actually say there was anything in principle wrong with the subjective approach in Morgan Smith. It was described as "one model which could be adopted in framing a law relating to provocation". 26 The entire thrust of the majority's attack on Morgan Smith was to do with the proper interpretation of the statute and the acceptable parameters of judicial interpretation. They believed the House of Lords had misconstrued section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957:
"However much the contrary is asserted, the majority view [ This was based on the idea that the House of Lords in R v Camplin 28 had definitively addressed the implications of section 3 and had accurately identified an objective approach towards the standard of self control required as follows:
"It means an ordinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed of such powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens will exercise in society as it is today." 29
This view was entrenched by reference to Lord Diplock's "model direction" in that case:
"He should ... explain to them that the reasonable man referred to in the question is a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused, but in other respects sharing such of the accused's characteristics as they think would affect the gravity of the provocation to him; and that the question is not merely whether such a person would in like circumstances be provoked to lose his self-control but also whether he would react to the provocation as the accused did." 30 The law of homicide was said by the majority in the Privy Council to be a "highly sensitive and highly controversial area of the criminal law" and that Parliament had altered the common law by virtue of the Homicide Act. It was "not open to judges now to change ('develop') the common law and thereby depart from the law as declared by Parliament." 31 The minority for its part emphasised the origins of the defence as a judicial response to the harshness of the law of murder: The Law Commission in its "Report on Partial Defences to Murder" 37 reviewed the rationale and operation of the provocation defence and made recommendations for reform. The proposal involved a new gender neutral partial defence for homicide committed in response to "gross provocation", fear of serious violence or a combination of both. The requirement for the accused to have lost his/her self control was removed, although it would not apply where the accused acted out of considered desire for revenge. In respect of the standard of self control, the Commission preferred the approach of the minority in Morgan Smith (now supported by the majority in Holley) which, it noted, also accorded broadly with the law in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 38 Thus the new defence would only be available if "a person of the defendant's age and of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or a similar way." 39
In its consultation paper, "A New Homicide Act for England and Wales?" 40 , the Law Commission provisionally proposed a new categorisation for murder whereby provocation would be a defence to first degree murder (where the accused intended to kill) and reduce this to second degree murder, not manslaughter. The principles would be the same as those outlined in the report on partial defences. 41 The Commission rejected the notion advocated by Mackay and Mitchell of combining the defences of provocation and diminished responsibility. 42 The upshot is that we are likely in due course to see the fundamental review of the law of murder that has been widely called for. Whether this leads to a more coherent and workable defence of provocation remains to be seen. 43
